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In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This contrast exemplifies the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and conflict resolution—even as this aligns with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This change is consequential, but analysts warn it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Selective Intervention

A comparable standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.